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"The Enemy Below- The Global Diffusion of Submarines and Related 
Technology" 
A Workshop Sponsored by 
The Center For Global Security Research 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
In Cooperation With 
The U.S. Naval Postgraduate School 
30-31 May, 2002, Monterey, California* 
Eh%&Summary of Discussion 
By Kenneth G.Weiss 
Introduction 
Roughly 80,000 years ago, our ancestors first crossed out of Africa, and began the process which 
we now call globalization. (Indeed, even earlier humanoid remains have been found outside 
Africa as long as 1.75 million years ago). With the diffusion of people around the world came the 
development of culture and civilization as well as the spread of ideas, goods, technology, and so 
forth. The process of globalization then is a long standing one, and not an innovation of the late 
20th and early 21st centuries. Over the millennia, this process has been an uneven one, and has 
often caused great disruptions even to the societies that initiated various innovations in culture 
and civilization, including science and technology. Indeed, many cultures and civilizations have 
disappeared while some regions failed to advance as rapidly as others, so the process of 
globalization is not just one of continuing progress. 
Globalization in the current era seems to be penetrating the most remote corners of the world at a 
remarkable rate as a result of advances in science and technology, particularly information 
technology. The difhsion of science and technology is not necessarily a benign development. It 
could increase the potential for a global military industrial base that may have an adverse impact 
on world stability in the future. For example, the diffusion of key military capabilities, like 
submarines, could have an impact, especially over the longer term, on the US. 
*The Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) has 
been sponsoring a series of workshops, leading eventually to a conference, focusing on the future of science 
and technology over the next fifty years, and its potential impact on national security. As part of this 
project, CGSR sponsored a workshop in cooperation with the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in 
Monterey, California on 30-31 May 2002 on the diffusion of submarines and related technology as a case 
study. This workshop was hosted by Dr. Ronald F Lehman 11, Director of the Center for Global Security 
Research, and RADM David R. Ellison, Superintendent of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and 
organized by Dr. Kenneth G, Weiss, a consultant to CGSIULLNL, with Professor Clyde Scandrett of the 
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, and with the invaluable support of Tami Alberto of CGSRLLNL with 
Stephanie Brand of NPS. The format of the workshop was interactive, emphasizing discussion among the 
invited specialists from the Navy, OSD, various national laboratories, academia, think tanks. Etc., along 
with some briefings to inspire discussion. 
Thus, the US ability to use its military forces, especially naval forces, to influence events 
globally in support of peaceful change may decline. Over time, the stresses and strains in the 
current international system, largely dominated by the West including Japan, may increase 
considerably with violent consequences. According to the UN the world's population will 
increase from 6 billion to 9 billion people by mid-century before leveling off. At the same time, 
population is declining in the West. Yet the West's life style and culture will continue to be 
attractive to many in the rest of the world, and thus a source of continuing tension and disruption 
in more traditional societies, less accustomed to rapid change. 
Submarines are ideal for a case study in technology diffusion. The submarine was largely an 
American invention, although the development of the technology can trace its origins back to 
Alexander the Great. In 1900, the US Navy bought the first successful submarine, as we know it, 
from John Holland who then founded the company that is today known as General Dynamics 
Electric Boat. These submarines quickly spread to the United Kingdom, France, and Russia, 
while Germany developed the U-Boat based on a competing American design by Simon Lake. 
Submarines played key roles in both World Wars, and the nuclear submarine, also fust developed 
by the US, spread to the other major nuclear powers during the Cold War. In the post Cold War 
era, submarines are likely to play even more important roles as the vulnerability of surface ships 
and associated aircraft increases. As one Chinese PLA officer stated the battleship dominated the 
seas in World War I, and the aircraft carrier in World War 11, while the submarine will be 
dominant in future wars. 
The US response to 9/11/01 in Afghanistan against the A1 Qaeda terrorist organization and its 
Taliban supporters highlighted the US'S continuing need to project and sustain power in distant 
theaters as well as deny sanctuary to its enemies. US naval capabilities are a key factor in the 
nation's ability to project power in remote regions of the world. In this regard, the US Navy's 
strategy shifted at the end of the Cold War from open ocean blue water operations to the support 
of joint operations in littoral waters. This strategic shift increases the threat of conventional 
foreign submarines (SS) and mines while nuclear submarines will also remain a threat (SSN). The 
US may be lagging in doctrine, strategy, and tactics in dealing with these capabilities. There is 
already a problem in countering the current foreign submarine threat, and it could become worse 
in the future. Moreover, the events of 9/11/01 emphasized the need to "expect the unexpected," 
and focused US attention on homeland defense. Submarine forces could become instruments of 
terror in the future. Hostile submarine forces, whether conventional or nuclear, in time could 
conceivably pose a threat, conventional or WMD, to homeland. As Secretary Rumsfeld has 
pointed out, the US should not plan to fight this or that country, but examine its vulnerabilities, 
and how an enemy might exploit them. Thus, the US must take into account a potential enemy's 
ability to exploit any submarine-related vulnerability. 
This summary of the workshop's discussion focuses on three key questions: What do we know 
or agree on; what don't we know or disagree on; and what requires additional research? In this 
regard, the following reflects the impressions of the author and no doubt does not adequately 
mirror the complexity and richness of the views expressed at the meeting. 
What Do We Know or Agree On? 
- Despite a decline in the numbers of submarine forces in general (458 in 1997,364 in 2002) 
following the Cold War, US ability to conduct anti-submarine warfare has declined even more. 
Allied ASW capabilities have declined as well. Currently, the US has 52 SSNs, 18 SSBNs, and 2 
S S A N .  The US Navy needs roughly three submarines to keep one forward deployed. 
- Over 40 counties have submarines in their naval inventory, over 30 of these are in the Third 
World. (In this context, Third World means only non-Western nations including Russia and 
China. It does not necessarily mean economically underdeveloped or technologically inferior. In 
fact, Russian submarines and related systems are very technologically advanced. Some nations in 
this category like Singapore are as economically advanced as some Western countries.) There are 
currently approximately 1 75 conventional submarines, including midget submarines in the Third 
World not including Russia and China, who also have roughly 45 nuclear (SSNESBN), 8 
conventional and 6 nuclear (SSNBSBN), 58 conventional, respectively. (See Table 1) 
' 
- With the Cold War over, the USN has cut back on ASW platforms, surface, air, and subsurface, 
and related technology, and has curtailed practicing ASW operations. Both Atlantic and Pacific 
commands are concerned about the decline in US ASW capabilities, 
- The very presence of potentially hostile submarines severely complicates US naval operations, 
and the ability to project power ashore. 
-Conventional submarines can be used for coastal defense (ASUW, ASW), merchant shipping 
interdiction, power projection, offensive and defensive mining, strategic missile platforms, 
intelligence gathering, special forces etc., although nuclear submarines provide greater range, 
speed, power, and endurance. 
- Submarines/submersibles could be used as unmanned underwater vehicles (vuv), or manned 
for drugrunning, piracy or terrorism. 
- Conventional diesel submarines are difficult to detect because they are quieter than the Soviet 
nuclear submarines that we hunted in the Cold War, and he who shoots fust has the advantage. 
-These submarines have/ may become increasingly more sophisticated. 
-Better batteries (snorkel every four days) 
-Air Independent Propulsion (Fuel Cells, Stirling Engine) 
-SSn (Small nuclear plant to generate power for propulsion-has yet to generate much interest) 
-Sophisticated submersibles like unmanned underwater vehicles 
-Integrated fire control systems for weapons, sensors, q d  targeting: 
- Advanced weapons, such as wakehoming torpedoes, submarine launched missiles with 
anti-surface, subsurface, and anti-air capabilities and improved naval mines; 
Advanced passive and active sensors, such as improved microelectronics, hullhow 
mounted arrays and flank and towed arrays, and 
Quieting technology, such as hull mounted anechoic tiles, rafted mounted machinery, 
permanent magnetic motors, improved propellers, etc; 
- 
- 
- Improved countermeasures for survival; 
- Automated systems requiring fewer personnel for operation, modular construction, etc. 
- Even older conventional submarine forces pose a threat. For example, the Chinese deployed a 
large number of Romeo submarines in a recent exercise, and such deployments are difficult to 
detect and keep track of. 
- The advent of Air Independent Propulsion (AIP), which are as quiet as diesel submarines 
running on batteries while submerged, may make it even more difficult to detect conventional 
submarines because they will be able to remain submerged for weeks at a time, instead of days 
like diesel submarines. (Conventional submarines on batteries can generally run more quietly than 
nuclear submarines because pumps to cool a submarine's nuclear reactors make noise.) 
- Even though many countries are opting largely to develop, acquire, or upgrade conventional 
submarine capabilities, nuclear submarines are not going away. Although the Russians are retiring 
or dismantling their older nuclear submarines, they are trying to retain as much of their 
construction capabilities as possible, and they are continuing to work, however slowly, on newer 
classes of SSNs and SSBNs. The Russians are also assisting the Chinese in developing a new 
class of SSNs and SSBNs as well as the Indian nuclear submarine program. The UK has leased its 
remaining conventional submarines of the Upholder class to Canada to concentrate on nuclear 
submarines. France is also dispensing with its conventional submarines in favor of its nuclear 
submarine program. However, the French are subsidizing conventional submarine exports to keep 
open their shipyards. 
- Nor can we discount improvements in stealth and other capabilities of foreign nuclear 
submarine forces, specifically the Russians and the Chinese. The Soviets made significant 
advances in quieting their nuclear submarines by the end of the Cold War, and the Russians will 
probably make greater advances in the fiture. Moreover, Soviet submarines were very capable in 
speed, diving depth, and weapons array. The Russians are generally willing to sell this 
technology. With their help, the Chinese new attack submarine under development may have the 
capabilities of a Victor 111, which represented a significant advance in quiet Soviet submarines. 
- Submarines and related technology will diffuse over time. Much of the technology can simply 
be purchased out right or manufactured on co-production and licensing arrangements from 
Russia, Germany, and France. These three countries also have a significant market for associated 
systems. For example. Russia, Germany, and France account for 67% of the sales for heavy 
torpedoes. Indeed, the Russian Shval torpedo or underwater missile available for export has a 
speed of 200 knots, and has no Western counterpart. Moreover, the Germans guarantee logistic 
support for their submarines as long the buyer does not go to war against them. They are also 
helping other countries through sales and technology transfer to improve their own production 
capabilities like China, India, Pakistan, South Korea, Brazil, etc. (See Table 2) 
-Moreover, there are other factors affecting the difision of submarines and related technology. 
For example, as the US and other countries rely more and more on commercial-off-the-shelf 
technology (COTS) for its weapons systems, other countries will have similar access. Advances 
in submarine and related technology can also be obtained on an unclassified basis in the US (and 
probably elsewhere) through conferences, publications, patents, Defense Technology 
Information Center (DTIC), National Technical Information System (NTIS), military and 
technology related websites on the internet, company websites, etc. For example, the Germans 
have been using modular construction for their submarines based on a US technology patented in 
the 1960s that the USN is only now utilizing in the new Virginia class of SSNs. European 
defensehbmarine manufacturers seem to be freer with providing technical related information 
than the US in order to make sales. They are also generally willing to transfer technology through 
licensing or co-production arrangements. What cannot be bought, or obtained on the internet, can 
be stolen potentially through espionage or other illicit arrangements, like the manufacturing 
capability to produce quiet propellers that the Soviets obtained from Toshiba. 
-Another reason submarine technology will diffuse over time: Third World countries, including 
Russia and China, will gain in scientific and technological expertise because they are training 
many of their students in the West, especially in the United States. In the 197Os, the State 
Department issued roughly 60,000 student visas; in 2001, the State Department issued 350,000 
student visas. Practically all the scientists in the Iraqi WMD programs were trained in the West, 
especially the US, including the father of the Iraqi nuclear weapons program. Many of these 
students are from Asia. 
- International export controls are weak, making it difficult to control the diffusion of submarine 
technology. Although the Wasennaar Arrangement replaced COCOM (and even includes Russia 
in membership) in controlling munitions and dual-use technology to rogue states and regions of 
instability, Wasennaar controls are extremely weak, and its members' national controls are 
unreliable. For example, one briefer claimed that Russia is apparently willing to export most 
weapons technology to China except nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The Russians are 
also assisting the Indian nuclear submarine project (ATV), and helping them to develop missiles 
for the ATV that the Indians could use for nuclear warheads. Moreover, the Russians little need 
to forego income earned from weapon sales, and would be very reluctant to agree to restraints on 
transfers of submarines or related technology. In addition, many Russians resent US claims to 
naval superiority. China has had a traditional aversion to informal supplier control regimes, 
seeing them as an effort to retard the development of Third World countries. (Others do not 
necessarily disagree concerning the difficulties of coming to agreement with other countries 
concerning supplier restraint, but point out that many believed that there was little chance of 
success in negotiating supplier regimes like the NSG, MTCR, and Australia Group, and thus 
efforts to strengthen Wasennaar or make other informal 
arrangements or requests concerning restraint in specific transfers may be worth exploring.) 
- A coordinated ASW effort is necessary. Commonly, a six to one ratio of surface, air, and 
subsurface platforms is required to deal with a single potentially hostile submarine. There are 
also promising research and development efforts underway to improve our ability to detect 
conventional submarines, but they remain in R&D because they have not been given enough 
priority to move towards the production phase. 
- A potential enemy might use its submarines to sink a US SSN if they could, and we might not 
even h o w  who did it. There are thousands of sailors aboard a single US aircraft carrier, and a 
submarine-related sinking of a carrier would be the equivalent to the destruction of the World 
Trade Center towers. US amphibious ships and resupply ships are particularly vulnerable, and 
their loss could cripple our ability to project power in a crisis or conflict. Furthermore, in the age 
of supertankers and giant container ships the impact of a campaign against merchant shipping 
might be felt more quickly than in World War 11. 
- Conventional submarines could be used to deliver WMD, nuclear or CBW, against the US 
homeland or bases overseas. They could also lurk outside a US or overseas base, and attack a US 
SSN or SSBN as it is entering or exiting port. 
- In regard to "expect the unexpected," an effort by terrorists, anti-nuclear activists, or a rogue 
state's special forces to seize an SSNBSBN at a US or overseas naval base, with incalculable 
consequences for US resolve and for the hture of the nuclear navy, cannot be wholly discounted. 
-US efforts to improve ASW capabilities are not likely to increase in the near future. Some argued 
that it would not improve until the Navy revived a high level organization dedicated to ASW, 
More dramatically, others argued that the US would not concentrate on ASW until a US ship 
was sunk by a foreign submarine. 
What We Do Not Know or Disagree On? 
- Some argue that the foreign submarine threat is overstated. Not only have the numbers of 
submarines declined, but some countries are hard pressed to operate the submarines they have. 
Modern submarine forces, even conventional ones, have become so expensive that many 
countries have either decided that they cannot afford them or limit the numbers that they buy or 
build. Yet there was agreement that our ASW capability has also declined. Moreover, others 
argue submarines that did not appear to be operational have surprised us in the past. 
- There has been a consolidation in the number of countries and companies building submarines. 
In the West, the Germans have all but cornered the market for conventional submarines with the 
French remaining their only serious competitor. (It is not clear if a US bank's purchase of HDW, 
the German submarine manufacturer, which also owns the Swedish submarine firm, Kockums, 
will give the US greater control over German sales. But it probably will not since the Germans 
have generally resisted US efforts to control the sales of US owned companies in Germany). For 
example, the Germans and French have been willing to sell submarines in regions of tension, such 
as South Asia. There was also some disagreement over the numbers of submarines they have sold 
or will sell. Yet those countries that have had submarine production capabilities like the UK, 
Italy, Netherlands, etc. seem to be trying to retain some residual capability so that they can ramp 
up in the future should the international environment or the market change. 
- Outside the West, the Russians are the only serious player with the possibility of China and 
India in the future. There was disagreement on how successful the Russians have been in making 
sales. The Russians have been working on AIP since the 1970s, and they envision equipping the 
Amur-class submarines, the follow-on class to the Kilo, with a fuel cell based AIP system. 
However, the first submarines of the class will rely on diesel engines and batteries for 
propulsion. The Russians hope to sell the Amur to the India and China. Some believe that the 
Russians have had difficulty in developing an AIP system, and may have a hard time selling the 
Amur. The Chinese are also very interested in acquiring or developing an AIP submarine 
capability as well as improving their indigenous conventional submarine manufacturing 
capabilities, while acquiring Kilo-class-submarines from Russia. There are reports that the 
Chinese may be developing an AIP system for their Ming-class submarines. Nevertheless, some 
point out that the Chinese have been experiencing significant difficulties developing their new 
Song-class of conventional submarines. 
- Although other countries in the Third World, such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, South Korea, etc, 
have some capability to construct submarines, they remain dependent on countries like Germany 
to complete them. However, others argue that these countries have ambitions to eventually 
develop independent capabilities of their own, and they could become sources for submarines 
and related technology to rogue state or regions of tension. For example, Germany and France 
have been willing to sell to India and Pakistan, and these countries could become sources for 
submarines and associated capabilities in the future. 
- Some countries have decided to upgrade existing platforms or buy older submarines from other 
countries. However, even modernizing old platforms can be very expensive. For example, there 
was some disagreement on how likely Third World submarine forces will buy wake homing 
torpedoes from the Russians. 
- AIP is not cheap, and can add as much as 15-20% to the cost of a submarine. Some argued that 
AIP may not prove to be attractive as some think, and that diesel submarines may remain 
sufficient for most roles and missions. On the other hand AIP is still experimental, and costs 
could go down as production increases. Also more capable AIP platforms may reduce the need 
for larger numbers of diesel submarines for most roles and missions. Moreover, the Germans and 
French are constructing their boats so AIP can be added if buyer should desire that option after 
purchasing the boats. For example. Pakistan, a poor country, has ordered three Agosta-class 
submarines from the French. The third boat is to be equipped for AIP, but the other two can be 
retrofitted for AIP in the future. However French technical help was suspended temporarily 
after French technicians became victims of a terrorist attack. 
- There was disagreement over the spread of nuclear-powered submarines globally. The 
development or acquisition of nuclear submarines is extremely costly, and thus are not likely to 
spread beyond a few countries. Nevertheless, India has a current effort to build nuclear 
submarines, called the Advanced Technology Vehicle program (ATV). Indeed India leased a 
Charlie-class nuclear submarine in the late 1980s from the Soviet Union, and has apparently been 
interested in acquiring an Akula I1 fiom Russia, but the cost may be prohibitive. Brazil and 
Argentina have had such ambitions in the past. 
- There was disagreement over how far Brazil's on agaidoff again program progressed with some 
arguing that the Brazilians succeeded in developing a prototype naval nuclear propulsion plant 
for a boat of about 2800 tons. Neither the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), nor its Latin 
American equivalent, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, provide a legal barrier to its signatories for the 
development of nuclear-powered submarines. The NPT does not prohibit the development of 
nuclear submarines. For example, the Canadians would never have violated their NPT obligations 
by developing 10-12 nuclear submarines as they seriously considered in the late 1980s. The 
Treaty of Tlatelolco, specifically permits the development of nuclear propulsion, and, in this 
regard, the Brazilians have maintained that nuclear submarines provide "transportation," and are 
not weapons per se. Indeed, the Brazilians retained their right to develop nuclear-powered 
submarines in joining these treaty organizations. 
- Conventional submarines can be used as nuclear weapons platforms. The Russians developed 
the Golf-SSB for this purpose, The Chinese still have a Golf-class submarine which has been 
used as a SLBM test bed. Some argued that the Israelis may be acquiring the Dolphin-class diesel 
submarine from Germany for this purpose, and the advent of AIP may make conventional 
submarines more attractive as a deterrent platform. Pakistan tried to buy a Hun-class SSN from 
China in the 1980s, and has stated that it would equip their conventional submarine with nuclear 
weapons to offset any Indian capability. Some doubted that the Pakistanis have the scientific and 
technical capability to adapt their French submarines, with a possible AIP capability, for WMD 
purposes. However, a nuclear device does not necessarily have to be delivered by torpedo or 
missile from a submarine to destroy a hostile port. 
- Some argue that a country needs an overall defense budget of at least $20 billion to be able to 
afford a submarine program, and that expense severely limits submarine program whether 
conventional or nuclear. Others point out that economic growth rates in many Third world 
countries may make submarine programs, even nuclear, more affordable in the future. For 
example, even Russia which had negative growth rates for most of the 1990s, posted a growth 
rate of 1.5% in 1999 and 6.7% in 2000. High oil prices over time will do wonders for the Russian 
economy. China has been scoring high growth rates since the advent of the Open Door policy in 
the late 1970s and even India seems to have broken through the Hindu growth rate of 4% to post 
above 5% and 6% growth rates in recent years. All three of these countries also have significant 
and growing scientific and technological capabilities. For example, economic development in the 
ASEAN countries have enabled many of them to purchase or consider acquiring submarines like 
Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia. Economic clout gives Taiwan the ability to acquire or develop 
a submarine program if the Taiwans can find someone willing to help them. Another one of the 
little dragons, South Korea, has been acquiring and developing submarines with the help of 
Germany despite US efforts to discourage Seoul in doing so. The South Koreans are even 
planning on acquiring AIP-equipped submarines from Germany. The Japanese are also interested 
in improving their submarine capabilities with AIP-equipped boats. Finally, even relatively poor 
countries, like Iran and Pakistan, will buy submarines to satis@ perceived military requirements. 
- There was some disagreement on how well some of these countries can operate these 
submarines. Ecuador, for example, does not operate them very well at all. However, friendly 
foreign submarines have succeeded in penetrating US carrier screens in recent exercises. The 
Indians believe that the Pakistanis are very capable submariners, and they themselves practice 
with the US in mind. It was not clear how well Iranian Kilos are manned and operated. However, 
it was argued that if we were really concerned we should simply mine Bandar Abbas, so they 
either could not exit or reenter after they left. Others pointed out that it was unlikely even in a 
crisis situation that the rules of engagement would permit mining Iranian harbors. In the past, 
Chinese submarine exercises have not ventured far from the coast, and they usually returned to 
port at the end of the day. However, the Chinese navy is moving towards more lengthy exercises 
in blue ocean waters. Some have argued that five of six Chinese nuclear submarines have not been 
active, or were non-operational, while others pointed out that this was not the case for the Xia 
SSBN at least. 
-It was not clear there was any agreement on the impact of submarine programs on regional 
stability. However. India's effort to develop or acquire a nuclear submarine capability has 
prompted Pakistan to seek some offsetting capability in the past. Moreover, the Indians seem to 
be acquiring nuclear submarines as a way of projecting power in the seas around China. Such 
regional tensions should be a concern to the US since conflict between or among nuclear powers 
is a serious threat to global stability even though India's nuclear and conventional submarine 
programs may not be aimed at the US. Indeed, India cannot rule out that the US might "lean" 
towards Pakistan as Washington did in the Indo-Pakistani War of 197 1 .  In that crisis, the US 
deployed the Enterprise carrier task force to the Indian Ocean as a warning to New Delhi not to 
occupy territory in West Pakistan. Thus, Indian submarine operations are conducted with the US 
in mind as well as Pakistan. Moreover, it probably is no accident that all the little dragons who 
could afford them are now acquiring or trying to acquire submarine capabilities. Of them, only 
Taiwan seems to have a reasonably clear reason for doing so unless the others are also concerned 
about Chinese intentions in the region. Even so, it seems that if one ASEAN state acquires a 
military capability the others want a similar one. 
What Other Questions or Issues Need Further Research? 
-Exactly how great has been the decline in US ASW capabilities, and what do we need to do 
about them? What about our allies? 
-We need further research identifjring diesel andor AIP submarine vulnerabilities, and new 
technologies that could help locate conventional submarines. Are there new technologies that 
would enhance a,US SSN ability to detect conventional as well as nuclear submarines? 
- We need further research into submarine-related military doctrine, strategy, tactics, operations., 
training and exercises of Third World submarine forces. 
-How will general developments in science and technology affect submarine warfare in the 
future? For example, the development of the diesel engine for railroad use before World War I1 
provided US submarines with greater speed and range. Among others, how will the exponential 
development of computing power in the future affect submarine technology, and how will 
submarines and ASW be integrated with "netcentric warfare?" 
- What implications does the spread of submarines have for research in computers/software/ 
algorithms, data management, materials sciences and engineering, weapons effects, MEMs 
technology, artificial intelligence, etc.? 
- In the future, are there any potential breakthroughs in ASW that could render the US deterrent 
force vulnerable to attack? Is the export of ASW-related dual use technologies making our 
S SN/SSBN force potentially more vulnerable? For example, the export of detection equipment 
for seabed oil drilling, and the use of SOSUS technology for academic related oceanographic 
research. 
- How vulnerable are our SSN/SSBN submarines to a terrorist attack or takeover? What about 
nuclear submarines of other countries? 
- Could A1 Qaeda or some other terrorist organization acquire submarines from Iran, North 
Korea, or some future fundamentalist government in Pakistan, Algeria, Malaysia, etc. to launch a 
WMD attack on the US homeland, US bases overseas, or elsewhere? 
- Could another country such as Iran use a conventional submarine, including midget submarines, 
to launch a sneak attack on a US port without us detecting their approach or even identifling the 
attacker afterwards? 
- What is the likelihood the submarines could be used for drug smuggling or piracy or other 
criminal activities? 
- What is the likelihood that other countries besides Israel may use conventional submarines as 
deterrent platforms? Can they develop the requisite nuclear or WMD capabilities or missile or 
torpedo launched WMD? Do they need to or could they just lay a WMD device in a port like a 
mine or place a device aboard a midget submarine or UUV? Have CBW capable-warheads been 
developed for submarines? 
- There is also need further research on the probability of additional countries acquiring nuclear 
submarines, and the hazards they may pose to nuclear proliferation, safety and the environment, 
regional stability, and US naval operations. There is also a need to explore the interrelationship 
between US national security, proliferation, environmental safety, and Russian nuclear submarine 
dismantlement. 
- What are the implications of the spread of submarines for arms control, nonproliferation, and 
export control arrangements? 
-We should look more closely at how Third World submarine forces affect our ability to 
influence crises through naval diplomacy, especially between nuclear powers like India, Pakistan, 
and China, as well as over a continuum of scenarios from peacetime operations to terrorism to 
confrontation or crisis to local war to conventional war to nuclear war. 
- Although this workshop concentrated on discussing the current submarine threat, there is a 
need for further research on how the threat may evolve over the longer term, especially with the 
advent of a multipolar world. 
Comment and Conclusion 
The end of the Cold War seemed to create a more peaceful international environment. September 
11 reminded us of the dangers of complacency. Indeed, even before September 1 1 US forces had 
intervened in a number of wars and crises, including Panama, the Persian Gulf War, Somalia, 
Rwanda, Bosnia, Kosovo, several Taiwan Straits crises, the North Korea nuclear weapons crisis, 
and most recently Afghanistan. US ability to intervene in remote areas of the world is often 
dependent on the Navy's ability to project power ashore. As a result, US ability to influence 
events in crisis situations, especially between or among nuclear powers, may become more 
difficult along with our ability to conduct littoral warfare. 
Although the numbers of potentially hostile submarines have declined with the end of the Cold 
War, US anti-submarine warfare capabilities have also declined. Moreover, foreign submarines 
and related technologies are likely to diffuse globally. New technologies like AIP, improved 
weapons and sensors will make conventional submarines more dangerous, and the spread of 
nuclear submarines even to a few more countries raise political, military, environmental, and 
safety concerns. Submarines are one of the key weapon systems used alone or in combination 
with other weapon systems such as coastal defense missiles, aircraft, and other sea-based missile 
platforms to deny US ability to project power ashore, Thus, other countries who wish to deny 
the US the ability to interfere with their regional or even global ambitions may emphasize the 
acquisition and/or development of submarines. 
As the world become more multipolar over the longer term, as the Chinese believe it will, 
countries such as Russia, China. etc., may be able to acquire the submarine capabilities to 
challenge us not just regionally, but in blue waters. To the extent that our alliance relationships 
require US naval access or superiority to sustain them, then our erstwhile frienddallies such as 
Japan, South Korea, ASEAN states, Taiwan, etc., may seek their own arrangements with other 
powers for their protection or seek WMD capabilities to offset the former reliance on the US. In 
addition to a loss of unchallenged regional access, the US may have to devote greater resources 
for protecting its homeland, and perhaps its sea-based deterrent, from hostile submarine forces. 
List of Terms 
AAW - anti-air warfare 
AG -Australia Group - international supplier regime to control ChemicaVBiologicaVWarfare - 
related precursors and technology. 
AIP - Air Independent Propulsion (Stirling engine, Fuel Cells): conventional submarines that do 
not rely on using a snorkel to obtain air to run the diesel engines to recharge their batteries while 
submerged. 
ATV - Advanced Technology Vehicle: India's nuclear submarine program. 
ASW - Anti-submarine Warfare 
ASUW - Anti-surface Warfare 
COCOM - Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls: the Cold War international 
organization which controlled munitions, dual-use, and nuclear related technology to the 
Communist bloc. 
CVN - Nuclear-powered aircraft carrier 
MTCR -- Missile Technology Control Regime: international supplier regime to control missile- 
related technology. 
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group - international Supplier regime to control nuclear weapons 
related technology. 
R&D - Research and Development 
SLBM -- Submarine launched ballistic missile 
SS - Conventional submarine 
S S A N  - Auxiliary nuclear submarine 
SSB -- ballistic missile conventional Submarine 
SSN - Nuclear-powered attack submarine 
SSn -- small nuclear plant to generate power for propulsion, Which has yet to generate much 
interest. 
SSBN - Nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine 
SSGN - Nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine 
Third World - Non-Western Countries, including Russia and China. Third World does not 
necessarily mean underdeveloped, There are some very economically advanced countries in the 
Third World, especially in East and Southeast Asia. Nor does it necessarily mean poor since the 
oil rich countries are in the Third Word. Finally, it does not necessarily mean technologically 
backward. For example, Russia produces state-of-the art submarines and associated weapon 
systems and other related technologies. 
UN - United Nations 
UUV - Unmanned Underwater Vehicle 
Wasennaar Regime: international supplier regime to control conventional weapons related 
technology including both conventional and nuclear submarines and related technology. However, 
controls in the Wasennaar Regime are considerably weaker than in the NSG, MTCR, and AG. 










































120 (77 nuclear, 43 diesel) 




17 (1 1 nuclear, 6 diesel) 
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53 (45 nuclear, 8 




10 (all nuclear) 
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0 (1 non-operational) 
3 
0 (acquiring submarines) 
*There will probably be discrepancies in the figures. Numbers for 2002 are taken from "The 
Submarine Census, May 2002," by A.D. Baker 111, 15 May 2002, Numbers for 1997 are taken 
from a table in Technology for the United States Navy and Marine Corps 2000-2035: Becoming a 
2lst-Century Force, Volume 7 Undersea Warfare, by the Naval Studies Board, National 
Research Council, National Academy Press, Washington, D.C., 1997, p.91. There was some 
dispute in the workshop on the inactive hon-operational status of China's nuclear submarines. 
So all 6 of China's nuclear submarines (1 Xia SSBN, 5 Han SSN) are listed as operational, 
although only one Han SSN is listed as operational in "The Submarine Census." 










North Korea (22 Romeo/Project 033 with most produced in NK 
Egypt, (4 Romeo/Type 033 which have been later modernized). 
Produces a number of classes -of nuclear and conventional 
submarines. Negotiated with Pakistan to provide Han SSN in 
late 1980s. 
Chile ( 2 Scorpene 2004-2005), India ( 6-12 Scorpene on 
order) , Malaysia (2 Scorpene/l Agosta on order), Pakistan 
(1 Agosta-90,2 more building in country, 2 Agosta, 4 Daphne), 
Portugal (2 Daphne), Spain (4 Agosta, 4 Daphne, producing 
Scorpene with France), South Africa (2 Daphne). Also 
produces SSNISSBN for France, and offered to transfer 
submarines and technology for constructing Rubis-class SSNs 
to Canada in the late 1980s. 
Argentina (2 TR-1 700,l Type 2091 1200), Brazil (4 Type 
209/1400, 1 Improved tbd,) Chile (2 Type 209/1300). 
Columbia (2 Type 209/1200), Denmark (3 Type 207), Ecuador 
(2 Type 209/1300), Greece (Type 214 AIR tbd, 4 Type 
209 1 1200,4 Type 209 1 1 loo), India (4 Type 209 1 1500 with 
India), Indonesia (2 Type 20911 300), Israel (Dolphin/IKL-800), 
Italy ( 2-4 Type 212A AIP with Italy), South Korea (3 Type 
214 A1 P on order, 9 Type 2091 1200), Norway (6 UldType 
210), Peru (6 Type 209/1200), Poland (1-3 Type 207 from 
Norway), South Africa (3 Type 209/1400, tbd), Thailand (2 
IKL-500 from Israel in negotiations), Turkey (4-8 Type 
209/1400 with Turkey, 6 Type 209/1200 with Turkey), 
Venezuela (2 Type 209/1300) 
Columbia (2 midget COS,M-0.S.SX-506), South Korea (3 
midget COS.M.O.S, SX756W), Pakistan (2 midget COS.M,O,S. 
MG-11 O),- Teaming with Germany to produce Type 2 12A 
AIP; retains residual submarine manufacturing capability as well. 
Egypt (Moray 1400 with USA in negotiations), Taiwan ( 2 Hai 
Lung) 
Vietnam (2 Sang-o coastal submarines) 
Algeria (2 Kilo), China 2 KiloBroject 636 with 1 on order? 2 
Kilo/Project 877 EKM) Iran (3 KilolProject 877/EKM), India 
c 
(2 AmdProject 677E with 6 built in India may be ordered. 10 
Kiloproject 877EKM, 2 Foxtroflrolect 641 M, 1 Foxtrot 
Project 641K), Poland (1 Kilo 877E), Romania (1 Kilo/Project 
877E-non-operational) , Ukraine (1 Kilo/Proj ect 877E-non 
operational). Russia produces both nuclear and conventional 
submarines. Has leased 1 Charlie-class SSGN to India, 1988 
199 1 : India and Russia have -had discussions on in transferring 
Akula 11 to India, but may be too expensive. 
Sweden (Germany) Denmark (I Nacken AIP), Singapore (3 Sjoormen with 1 
tbd). Germany’s HDW now owns Kockums, the Swedish 
submarine manufacturer. 
United Kingdom Leasing 4 Upholder-class SS to Canada; retains some residual 
conventional submarine manufacturing capability. Produces 
SSNs/SSBNs: offered to transfer Trafalgar-class SSNs to 
Canada in late 1980s. 
United States Egypt (Moray 1400 with Netherlands), Taiwan (2 Guppy-1 1A\ 
For training; seeking partner to produce conventional submarines 
for Taiwan). No longer produces conventional submarines, but 
US shipyards interested in teaming with others to manufacture 
submarines for Egypt/Taiwan. Produces nuclear submarines for 
own use, but does not generally export nuclear submarines/ 
technology. 
Other Producers Australia (5 Collins/Type 47 1, 1 fitting out) Japan (4 Oyashio 
(4 building, 2 planned), 6 Harushio, 5 Yushio, 1 Harushio AIP in 
trials and training, 1 Yushio training; Japan does not export 
armaments as a matter of national policy.) 
Some Production Capacity Argentina (some production capabilities/ambitions), Brazil 
(Type 209s with Germany; latent ambitions to produce nuclear 
submarines). Chile (some production capabilitiedambitions). 
India (Type 209s with Germany. developing AT, V SSGN: has 
produced Foxtrots in past), Pakistan (Agosta-90s with France), 
South, Korea (Type 214 AIP and Type 209 with Germany, 3 
midget Dolgorae), Spain (produces Scorpene with France), 
Yugoslavia? (1 Savqmidget Una. 1 midget Una modified in 
Croatia). 








 .. . 
: 
.
.
 
. 
.
.
 
I 
p 
6 z 
